Abstract

U.S. AGENCY PRINCIPAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATES

Clifford Fisher, Meredith Pohl, Holden Aven

Volume: 6 Issue: 4 2016

Abstract:

In the late 1780s, the citizens of this newly free American republic were battling amongst themselves over the proper direction of the future of their country. After the failure of the Articles of Confederation, many colonial leaders agreed that a stronger central system was needed. Arguments raged in pubs and dinner tables, eventually culminating in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The Convention lasted for months as the Founding Fathers decided on the structure of this new democracy: bicameralism, the separation of powers, and the federal structure of the national government. Eventually, they produced the document we now know as the Constitution of the United States. However, following the Convention there was much disagreement among those unwilling to support its ratification in their respective colonial governments. They worried about the possible strength of this new central authority. Having just ousted an autocratic king in the long, bloody Revolution, citizens were weary of an executive power seizing their newfound sovereignty and political freedom.

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