Abstract

Examining Models for Measuring Corporate Governance to Resolve Financial Crises

Jabbar Sehen Issa, Asmaa Habib Alnasiry

Volume: 12 Issue: 1 2022

Abstract:

This document deals with corporate governance and its impact on corporate performance and economic performance. This work is first summarized and based on previous work done, for example, to provide a clearer expression of the corporate governance models of shareholders and shareholders. It then addresses some of the key factors that lead to the effectiveness of corporate governance, and examines some of the strengths, weaknesses, and economic consequences associated with different corporate governance systems. In addition to providing information not provided in previous work, it also provides new information on the concentration of ownership and voting rights in a number of OECD countries. This document also provides empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance, firm performance, and economic growth. Finally, several policy implications are identified.

DOI: http://doi.org/10.37648/ijrssh.v12i01.005

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